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Abstract
The explosion of information technology has enabled real-time intelligence to become an invaluable tool to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC). This capability has led to an increased drive to allow the JFACC tighter control over airborne assets, adding flexibility to the JFACC's response options, but, in effect, "centralizing" execution. What is the implication of this centralization on the decision making process involving airborne missions? What is the appropriate level of control for the processing of real time intelligence in future air operations? Does the responsibility lie within the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)? The primary purpose of this paper is not to answer these questions, rather it is to pose them and other issues as items to consider for operations and identify areas for future research. In doing so it examines the JAOC
Introduction
The capability of technology to alter organizational relationships may be invaluable or dysfunctional based on the effect it has on the organism.
-General Charles A Horner, Comments on EFX 98
The explosion of information technology on the battlefield has led to tremendous strides in the ability to process and disseminate information on a large scale. Real-time intelligence has become an invaluable tool to the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) and his ability to quickly make decisions. Airborne command and control platforms with continuous links to both the JFACC and the strike package have the ability to pass this information directly to the warfighter. Internal Data Modem (IDM) capable aircraft bring the ability to pass thousands of bits of information securely through the airwaves. These capabilities have led to an increased drive to allow the JFACC tighter control over airborne assets after "wheels in the well," adding greater flexibility to the JFACC's response options.
Statement of the Research Question
Real time intelligence integration in future air campaigns is inevitable. What is the implication of this enhancement for the decision making process involving airborne missions? How can this information be used to tailor the air battle? What is the appropriate level of control for the processing of real time intelligence in future air operations? Does the responsibility lie within the Joint Air Operations Center (JAOC)?
The primary purpose of this paper is not to answer these questions, rather it is to pose them and other issues as items to consider for operations and identify areas for future research.
Background and Significance
There have been great strides recently, in information technology, which has allowed the processing of near-real time and real time intelligence in the JAOC of tomorrow.
Recent exercises and experiments have dedicated time and defense dollars to analyzing the significance of information innovation. War games designed to test air commanders' flexibility to change have increasingly relied on simulated real time inputs into the decision process. 1 Increased flexibility, however, does not come without the ability to stretch. How much is too much? What information is important to focus on real-time and how can it be incorporated into decisions that must be made within seconds of its arrival? Since the volume of information available may be too large to process, a certain amount of the decision tree would most likely be automated.
2 How vulnerable will this automation be to a smart enemy who knows what indicators to change in order to shape our actions?
Once the decision is made, what information must be passed to the airborne assets and what are the options of execution? Finally, how much increase in centralized control can occur before it becomes detrimental to decentralized execution? 
Limitations of the Study
This study only addresses the impact of information technology advancements on the airborne strike package. In doing so it paints a picture of the current JAOC structure, the JFACC's decision making process, and the possible impact of future technology integration in the command and control process. It is not intended to be a complete portrayal of the JFACC and JAOC roles in the air phase of a theater campaign, rather it is to provide a cursory view of the targeting process and the impact of change on that process. Additionally, due to the desire to discuss command and control process rather than specific platform capabilities, all discussion will be kept at the unclassified level.
Platform specifics will not be discussed.
Definitions and Assumptions
For the purpose of this paper, Dynamic Re-tasking is the ability of the JFACC to effect changes in targeting and mission to an airborne strike package, or portions of that package, while in the execution phase. It involves command and control elements actually stopping the execution of airborne assets and redirecting those assets to other targets. It may also involve the coordination of other assets not associated with the airborne strike package in order to complete the mission. It is assumed the re-tasked assets have no prior knowledge of their newly assigned target (i.e. that it is not a preplanned alternate target). Information passed at the re-tasking is the first information the airborne asset has on their new target. Re-tasking is the result of some change in the enemy order of battle or the emergence of a higher priority target that requires, in the eyes of the JFACC, immediate response.
Additionally, this paper discusses the impact of information technology on the level of execution. As depicted in figure 1 , the dilemma presented in the conduct of future operations is whether or not information technology will enable more decentralized execution, as in the era of blitzkrieg maneuver warfare, or, will command become even more centralized. This paper differentiates this increased level of centralized control as the "centralization" of execution. Centralized execution occurs when control of operations, that in the past were left to the mind of the commander in the field, are now under direction of a centralized command structure, in this case the JAOC. In effect, the centralized command element maintains control of the execution phase, rather than delegating the authority to act to the field commander. 
Preview of the Argument
Major Components
What follows is a brief discussion of the major components of the JAOC structure. 
Functional Area and Mission Experts. Functional Area and Mission Experts may
be part of the elements listed above or they may be separate entities. They provide the necessary expertise to support, planning, and execution functions appropriate to the employment scenario. They also provide the expertise to plan and employ forces made available by the components. They work at all levels of command and in all areas of the JAOC. The first phase of the planning process is operational environment research. In this phase information is gained about friendly and adversary capabilities and intentions, doctrine, and the environment in which operations will take place. This phase is primarily the intelligence preparation of the battle and the gaining of knowledge of the operational environment. During this phase, intelligence data is gathered and analyzed.
Current Decision Making Process
Additionally logistic information and command relationships are gathered and developed.
The second phase of the planning process deals with objective determination. This is where clear and quantifiable objectives are laid out congruent with JFC guidance.
The third phase is strategy identification, the product of which is a defined joint strategy statement. The joint air strategy states how the JFACC plans to exploit joint air capabilities to support the JFC's objectives. This joint air operations plan is how the JFACC communicates this strategy to the joint air forces under his operational and tactical control.
Phase four is the identification of Centers of Gravity. During this phase all intelligence information is carefully examined and analyzed to identify centers of gravity to focus the air portion of the campaign against.
The final phase is the development of the Joint Air Operations Plan. This plan integrates the efforts of joint air forces to accomplish the JFC's objectives. It identifies a priority for targets and objectives. It accounts for current and potential adversary offensive and defensive threats. It lays out timing for joint air operations to phase in capabilities as needed. It conducts target analysis to identify specific targets for reattack.
Target analysis and the art of targeting is key to the understanding of the Dynamic Re-tasking problem. As stated in 3-56.1, "Targeting is the process of selecting targets and matching the appropriate response to them." It occurs at all levels of command. It is The joint air tasking cycle is analytical and systematic in its approach to the development of the air tasking order. It is heavily reliant on up to date intelligence information and the analysis of that information to ascertain its effect on the JFC concept of operations. There are usually three ATOs in the works at any one time, one in execution, one in production, and one in planning
Essentials
The development of a coherent air attack plan is heavily dependent on the quality of information gathered and the analysis of that information. During the target development phase, the JAOC combat plans section identifies, prioritizes, and selects specific targets that meet the JFC objectives and guidance. Targets are selected from the joint target list (JTL), component requests, intelligence recommendations, and electronic warfare input.
As a product of a process, the JTL is normally constructed by the unified command and begins before the deployment or the onset of hostilities. Its early stages begin during the development of the OPLAN or CONPLAN that will govern operations. Inputs from the Joint Staff and other government agencies are incorporated into the list, and maintenance of the list is conducted by the JFC staff based on inputs from the JFC and information from the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) and the theater joint intelligence centers (JICs). The product of the target development phase is a list of approved targets that are included in the ATO and assigned to combat forces through the weaponeering and ATO development phases.
During the weaponeering and allocation phase, targeting personnel take the joint integrated priority target list (JIPTL) developed from the targeting phase and detail recommended aimpoints, numbers and types of aircraft and weapons, weapon fuzing, target identification and description, target attack objectives, target area threats and probability of destruction for each target. The final list is included in the MAAP, which forms the basis for the joint ATO. During this same phase, the JFACC staff determines the total number of sorties required by aircraft and weapon type available for each operation. From this determination, air support requests and allocation requests are made. These include the total number of joint air sorties to be flown and the request for any additional air support beyond the capability of the air component.
After the MAAP is approved, the Combat Plans section continues the production of the joint ATO, special instructions (SPINS), and the airspace control order (ACO).
Components may submit change requests to targets and assets during the final stage of ATO development.
Once the joint ATO is approved and distributed the JFACC directs the execution. It is clearly evident, a multitude of systems exist for the dissemination of information. This information is filtered into the ATO cycle during the development of the MAAP discussed previously.
Real Time Command and Control Assets
Command and Control is exercised by the JFACC through multiple sources. The initial form of command and control is in the development of the ATO where the JFACC's master plan is disseminated to the forces. After the ATO leaves the JAOC the JFACC can still control its execution through landlines and other communications with the operations centers of geographically separate units. As the mission is in progress, however, the JFACC has to work through other assets to control operations real time.
Control and Reporting Centers (CRC) are ground-based tactical control hubs and have communicative capability with airborne missions depending on the phase of the operation. Airborne assets for control include E-3B Airborne Warning and Control 
System (AWACS), J-STARS, and occasionally EC-130E Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC
Real Time Decision Making
While fighting is a physical act, its direction is a mental process.
-B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy
The ATO, once published, is the order tasking the component forces to accomplish elements of the MAAP. 1 Changes must be made to that plan based on analysis of information that has changed since its inception.
The Decision Making Process
John Boyd conceptualized the decision making process as a nodal loop consisting of four phases ( Figure 7 ). The premise is that commanders observe, orient, decide, and act.
At this point commanders return to the beginning of the cycle and begin the process again. 2 Boyd calls this process the OODA Loop and likens it to a turning fighter engagement. The idea is that if one can turn inside their adversary they can defeat them.
He postulates that the commander who can make observations, determine their meaning, decide among courses of action, and then act on those courses of action quicker than their adversary, will gain the upper hand. Operations, portraits a cognitive hierarchy for information flow. Data received must first be collected and transported from intelligence sources. This is the phase during which initial filtering occurs. Following this it is processed, which refines the data into information. It is then fused, filtered, and further manipulated with other information in a cognitive process that results in knowledge. Finally, an evaluation of this knowledge based on experience is accomplished, which leads to understanding. This understanding can then be acted upon to effect change to the battle plan. 3 The aim of technology integration in C4I systems is to accelerate the transformation from data to understanding, thereby making the commander's OODA Loop as small as possible.
Changes to the MAAP occur as a result of this understanding. The process however, currently exceeds the capability to drastically change while in the execution phase.
Complex command and control structures, geographically separated units, differing communication systems capabilities, and differences in component doctrine, tactics and jargon, all hinder change. Coordination requirements for current operations are such that changes to a plan are either manifested in preplanned alternate targeting or in mission cancellation.
Future Technology Integration
Great strides are planned for future integration of technology as an enabler for the JFACC to exercise command and control real time in a Dynamic Re-tasking of airborne assets. The creation of a global C4 infrastructure will dramatically increase the data available to the JAOC. The push for standardization and interoperability among joint force systems and doctrine as well as multinational systems will provide the JFACC the communicative means to effect change. 4 Having the data available and a means of communication however do not complete the picture. The data must be transformed into understanding before it can be used to effect execution.
Automated Information Management
During EFX-98, the JAOC employed the Theater Battle Management and Control System (TBMCS) to host all intelligence and operation information. Through TBMCS the staff of the JAOC was connected to the virtual battlespace and received real time changes to the tactical situation. Processing over 2,500 intelligence messages per day and producing an average of 2,106 mission updates per day, the Situation Awareness and Assessment (SAA), as well as the Time Critical Targeting (TCT) modules of the TBMCS allowed the JAOC staff to monitor and access missions real time.
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The Future JAOC EFX 98 experimented with new and untested command and control devices, processes and organizations. Using the TBMCS as mentioned above, the JFACC was presented a virtual world in which to operate. Split headquarters, Forward and Rear JAOCs, were set up and connected through the TBMCS using a worldwide info-sphere.
In theory this would allow the JFACC to have less of a forward presence footprint and enable greater connectivity to national information assets. 6 Presented with the big picture real time, the JFACC can make decisions based on real time intelligence processing. The size of the Forward JAOC need be only that required to maintain connectivity to the fielded forces. This concept allows for a reduction in size of advanced headquarters with concomitant benefits in reduced airlift requirements, fewer personnel exposed to enemy fire, and more centralized staffs. 7 Presumably, increased communicative conductivity with fielded forces combined with understanding of real time intelligence information will allow the JFACC of the future to tailor the air battle to the evolving tactical environment. Changes no longer will dictate cancellation of missions in the daily ATO; they may instead be redirected, more effectively shaping the air portion of the campaign to combat enemy courses of action. Germans concluded early in 1944 that the Allies would invade the continent; however, when and where this invasion was to occur was not known. The most probable location for a landing was speculated to be at Pas de Calais due to its short distance from points of embarkation to debarkation and the threat a breakthrough in that region would do to the German war effort. With this predisposition of thought the stage was set for Fortitude South.
The basis of Fortitude South was the concept that the Allies had amassed enough resources to conduct a diversionary landing in addition to a main assault along the coast.
The overall plan used element of camouflage, signal discipline, restricted zoning and other security schemes to conceal the real invasion force. Information was fed to German intelligence through double agents that bolstered the Pas de Calais idea in intelligence circles. Six supporting operations contributed to intelligence indications supporting a Pas de Calais invasion. Quicksilver I was a fictional plan for a cross channel assault at Pas de Calais by the First United States Army Group (FUSAG). Quicksilver II was a radio deception that simulated army group traffic for the fictional FUSAG. Quicksilver III was the visual demonstration of landing craft along the eastern coast of England. Quicksilver IV was actual bombing of Pas de Calais fortifications. Quicksilver V was bombing operations aimed at communications networks behind Pas de Calais beaches. Quicksilver VI was an elaborate light scheme operation that simulated numerous port and assembly facilities on England's eastern and southwest coast while concealing operations at the actual sites. The Allies knowledge of German High Command's thinking, due to the breaking of the Enigma code, allowed the Allies to adjust their deception to obtain the desired results. This deception was so strong that, even after the Normandy invasion, German command thought Normandy was a diversion for a main invasion still to come six weeks later at Pas de Calais.
The Gulf War 3
During the Gulf War deception was a major item emphasized to conceal the intentions of the coalition forces. The deception involved convincing the Iraqi forces the main push of the coalition invasion was going to come from an amphibious assault on the coast of Kuwait. The positioning of Marine and Naval units in the Gulf led to this deception. Marine landing exercises along the Gulf and in Oman helped sell this deception as did timing and placement of air attacks. The lack of aerial attack on some targets in the west added additional indication that the attack would come from the east.
In effect these actions fixed Iraqi forces in the east allowing the well know left hook, that cut off the Iraqi route of retreat, to occur with little resistance.
Impact on Critical Decision Making
These are but two examples of deception in action to shape the response of the enemy. In Fortitude South, the Allies were aware the Germans were focusing on tasks increase stress in that they cut deeply into residual capacity, provide a sense of uncontrollability, and are intrusive and distracting to the performance of the primary task. 4 Wearing the hats of ACA and AADC, in addition to promulgating the air portion of the campaign, both current and days in advance, leaves little doubt the JFACC has many secondary tasks. Under stress, people experience a tremendous amount of cognitive constriction that disrupt the normal thought processes. Reaction to real time intelligence input has little room for error.
The idea that technological innovation will be able to render information with such clarity and accuracy that commanders will no longer have to deal with uncertainty in their decisions fails to take this notion of intelligence indicator manipulation into account.
Commander Valentine, in his paper on operational art, warns if operational decisions were based solely on the picture presented through automation, the risk is run of not making a decision at all but merely fashioning a product of mathematical analysis and logical conclusion based on perfect information. 5 That is, if that information was truly perfect.
Tactical Paralysis?
When presented with a large amount of data to process, the human mind must sort this data, decide what data is valuable from that which is not, transform that data to understanding as described in the previous chapter, devise courses of action, and then choose to act on one of those courses of action. Colonel Littlefield points out "the art of war has come a long way since the days of the Roman legions where commanders could see the entire battlefield with the naked eye." 6 In those days the commander could see nearly all from a vantagepoint on the high ground and act on it. Today, technology integration is allowing that "standing on a hill" aspect of great captaincy to return, however the valley has become the size of the entire theater and in some cases the world.
Data from the many sources discussed in Chapter 2 act as the looking glass for the commander. This amount of information and a theater sized force structure allows the JFACC freedom to form many alternate courses of action. This, combined with the time pressure and secondary task stress noted above, may lead to a situation where the JFACC is presented with too many courses of action to choose from in the allotted time. Peter
Senge indicates that an increased amount of information does not necessarily lead to better, more timely decisions. This would be exaggerated by automated information in that it may result in leaders paying attention to highly visible but misleading data. In fact, increased information may overwhelm and paralyze decision-making. 7 This paralysis is defined in Douglas Coupland's book Generation X: Tales for an Accelerated Culture as "option paralysis." 8 Option paralysis occurs when one has so many options to consider in the selection of a course of action that none is selected before the allotted time expires.
In the JAOC this same phenomenon could result in "tactical paralysis."
Notes
Chapter 5 Where Can Dynamic Re-Tasking Work?
What the Warrior Needs: a fused, real time, true representation of the battlespace -an ability to order, respond and coordinate horizontally and vertically to the degree necessary to prosecute his mission in that battlespace.
- 
Preconditions for Success
For Dynamic Re-tasking to have the dramatic effect it is intended to a certain degree of centralized execution must be exercised by the JFACC. This analogy falls short, in that, unlike chess, the pieces in war have their own OODA loop that can contribute to the whole. They are not pawns or unthinking automatons.
They are closer to the battle and see nuances the commander may not be able to see. The real battlespace is larger than 64 squares. Forces in that battlespace move and react with the level of detail that allow them to maximize their effect. When orchestrated in knowing concert they synergistically magnify their capability with others. Uninformed they are merely fodder, no more effective than the armies of World War I charging out of the trenches simply because they were told. For Dynamic Re-tasking to work, execution must be centralized yet remain decentralized.
Required Information
To effect this centralized / decentralized execution, the fielded forces must be as one with the JFACC. They must understand the concept of the required task, its implication, and how it fits into the order of battle. All coordination must occur for synergistic effects. For example if a strike package is re-tasked from their original targets to a different target set, they must know key elements of information. The enemy disposition of forces must be known for the new location. Threats to the strike package must be identified and reduced. This may require, alternate routes of flight, timing changes, or additional assets not organic to the strike package. If such is the case this information must be provided so forces do not go blindly into the face of an overwhelming threat without purpose. Abort criteria must be established. New target descriptions as well as avenues of approach must be determined. Weaponeering changes in spacing and fuzing of munitions may need to occur. The more complex the strike package, threat, target set and coordination become, the less susceptible the mission is to Dynamic Re-tasking. The effects of re-tasking must not only be determined on the current strike package but also for subsequent packages that may have been depending on a previous mission obtaining certain results. The entire JAOC planning cell must be involved. One change may effect the entire plan.
Critical Requirements
Free information flow from the JFACC to the warfighter is a must to enable the fielded force the ability to execute. True interoperability between weapon platforms is a must for Dynamic Re-tasking to work. Platforms re-tasked must have connectivity to other platforms in the original strike package. Additionally they must have connectivity to the platforms in the re-tasked package for the case of split package re-tasking. Secure IDM capability is required to pass more information quickly to all affected. Common jargon and tactics are required for inter-service operations. Current target and threat information is a must. Pre-conceived attack plans may be beneficial as a generic play card to orchestrate the synergistic effect of different assets. These, however, must be guarded for compromise.
A flattened command and control structure is needed to provide greater connectivity to the JFACC. 2 Communication links and data links must be streamlined. Commonality of systems is a must. The JAOC may need to be restructured and expanded with systems providing for greater control of current operations. At the same time more connectivity of the warfighter to the "big picture" in the JAOC is critical for decentralizing the central execution.
Impact of Dynamic Re-tasking
The impact of Dynamic Re-tasking, if accomplished correctly, will enable the JFACC to tailor the air battle to the current situation. This will be done real time and allow the JFACC the opportunity to work inside the opponent's OODA loop. Combined with the ATO process, Dynamic Re-tasking can create an ability for the JFACC to effect change more rapidly by hitting critical nodes of the opponent at critical times, magnifying their effect. The interoperability described previously can provide the JFACC with a "thinking" chessboard. An interactive connected battlespace will allow separate operations to occur as one.
Missions Susceptible to Re-tasking
Current capabilities limit the number and type of missions susceptible to Dynamic Re-tasking. Communicative limitations already noted greatly reduce the effectiveness that can be achieved from re-tasking. Currently, re-tasking should only occur on a limited number of aircraft on relatively benign missions that do not involve great knowledge of the battlespace peculiarities. Low threat and minimal coordination is a must for re-tasking efforts today. Units re-tasked must be given targets that have the same munition requirement as their originally planned targets. If the JFACC knows ahead of time a particular mission will most likely be re-tasked and to what target or type of target, that information must be transmitted to the unit prior to its execution. Any coordination efforts that can be prebriefed as an option before execution should be. After the mission is airborne, little coordination should occur of which the aircrew are not aware.
Should change occur as discussed that dramatically increases the connectivity of all warfighters in the battlespace, there is no limit to the type of missions that would be susceptible to Dynamic Re-tasking. The "thinking chessboard" could implement the JFACC's Master Air Attack Plan with full knowledge of the effect on other warfighters.
Suppression of enemy air defenses could occur before the enemy had an opportunity to react. Weapons of mass destruction could be identified and targeted prior to their use on friendly troops. Land commanders could request changes that interdict enemy troop movements at critical times. Battle damage assessments could be made prior to the last aircraft across a target area and changes made ensuring priority targets are destroyed.
Dynamic Re-tasking employed in this manner with full connectivity would act as a force multiplier, reducing the enemy's capability while reducing the number of friendly sorties required to complete the plan. -FM 100-6, Information Operations.
Dynamic Re-tasking can be of benefit to the JFACC of the future. It will act as a force multiplier to enable more efficient and effective use of air power. Dynamic Retasking is a technological benefit of the information age that allows the use of information integration in the JAOC to be translated to operations in the field. General
Horner points out, however, "The lure of fancy graphics must not outweigh the need to improve our means of killing people and destroying things with air power." 1 The cognitive process involved in the ATO cycle through the incorporation of intelligence information in targeting is an involved process. The JFACC has a plethora of duties and concerns. The macro-view at times may not be the view from which to execute. If this view is not transmitted to the warfighter during the execution phase, they become nothing more than automatons, or pawns executing orders. 
